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I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous authors, from all points on the political spectrum, have advocated that
police interrogations be taped.' But police rarely record custodial questioning, at least
in full, and only a handful of courts have found this failure objectionable.2 This
commentary outlines three different constitutional grounds for mandating that such
recording become a routine practice.
To set up the constitutional arguments, I first outline why taping is needed
despite the elaborate rules that now govern interrogation. Put simply, the reasoning is
as follows: the Miranda regime has failed, voluntariness should once again be the
focal point of interrogation regulation, and taping is necessary to push courts in that
direction. I then explain why a taping requirement should be more than a policy
preference. To date, the primary contention in this vein has been based on the due
process duty to preserve exculpatory evidence. Although that argument has not fared
well in the courts, I think it can be recast more persuasively and try to do so here. I
also put forward two other constitutional grounds for a taping requirement: the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, with an emphasis on how it
functioned in colonial times, and the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, as
distinct from the right to counsel. If one of these arguments can win the day, it will
revolutionize the interrogation process much more radically than did Miranda.
II. MIRANDA'S MIRAGE
Miranda v. Arizona3 is a hoax. By now the story is a familiar one. Contrary to
the predictions of Miranda's enemies and the hopes of its proponents, the warnings
regime established by that case has had very little impact on the way police conduct
interrogations. Confessions continue at virtually their pre-Miranda pace.4 More
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1 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 387,489-92 (1996); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 105, 153-55 (1997).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 30-32 & 44.
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4 For a thorough review of the research and differing interpretations of it, see George C. Thomas
III, Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A "Steady-State " Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA
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importantly, Miranda has had little effect on police behavior during interrogation.
The best evidence for this conclusion is that the Inbau & Reid manual against which
the Miranda majority inveighed thirty-five years ago, now in its fourth edition with
two new authors,5 is virtually unchanged. It still advocates use of the Mutt & Jeff
routine, the pretended friend technique, exaggeration and falsification of evidence,
and all the other horribles described by Chief Justice Warren in Miranda.6
Worse still is that Miranda may act as a cover for all of this, by leading to
judicial myopia about voluntariness, supposedly the ultimate issue in interrogation
regulation. Many have noted that once the warnings are given and a "valid" waiver
obtained, courts are extremely likely to find confessions "voluntary. 7 And this
immunizing effect may not be the only way Miranda has (inadvertently) sabotaged
the voluntariness inquiry. By shifting the constitutional foundation of interrogation
analysis from due process and "fundamental fairness" to the Fifth Amendment and
compulsion,8 Miranda seems to have made it easier for courts to ignore police tactics
that rely on trickery rather than coercion.9 The decision that decried the false friend
L. REv. 933,953-59 (1996) (concluding that the post-Miranda confession rate is most likely somewhere
between 52% and 55%, whereas pre-Miranda rates were in the 45% to 60% range).
5 FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS (4th ed. 2001).
6 Compare id. at 240-98 with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55.
7 Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REv. 673, 744-45 (1992) (stating that
Miranda may have "served to insulate the resulting confessions from claims that they were coerced or
involuntary."); George C. Thomas III, The End of the Roadfor Miranda v. Arizona?: On the History and
Future of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 18 (2000) ("Once a suspect waives
Miranda (and most do), routinized Miranda ritual lulls judges into admitting confessions with little
inquiry into voluntariness."). Welsh White could find only nine cases in a recent two-year period in
which confessions obtained after a waiver were excluded, and four of these were based on state
constitutional grounds. White, supra note 1, at 1219 n.54. White concluded that "[a] finding that the
police have properly informed the suspect of his Miranda rights thus often has the effect of minimizing
or eliminating the scrutiny applied to post-waiver interrogation practices." Id. at 1220.
8 Although the current Court essentially equates "voluntariness" with lack of coercion, pre-
Miranda cases focused on an independent "fairness" concern as well. See Paul M. Bator & James
Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible
Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 62, 73 (1966) ("[T]he concept of involuntariness seems to be
used by the courts as a shorthand to refer to practices which are repellent to civilized standards of
decency or which, under the circumstances, are thought to apply a degree of pressure to an individual
which unfairly impairs his capacity to make a rational choice.").
9 As a practical matter, voluntariness analysis under the due process clause and waiver analysis
under Miranda have been virtually identical when it comes to deception. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
230 (5th ed. 1999) ("Lower courts have generally not distinguished between the impact of deception on
voluntariness as a general requirement and on the effectiveness of waivers."). But holdings like those in
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (holding that confusion over effect of refusal to sign
waiver form does not render Miranda waiver invalid) and Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987)
(holding that confusion over focus of interrogation does not render Miranda waiver invalid) are easier
when the focus is whether the police tactics "compel" rather than whether they are "fair." Cf Miranda,
384 U.S. at 507 n.4 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing law of voluntariness as invalidating interrogation
methods viewed as "repellent to civilized standards of decency").
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technique, in all its forms, at the same time provided the conceptual basis for
declaring it legal, because deception is often not coercive. 10 Miranda's focus on
compelled self-incrimination rather than fairness may also have encouraged courts to
be more accepting of police promises of leniency" and more dismissive toward claims
of untrustworthiness.12 Although these developments are not illogical, given the fact
that neither scenario is necessarily correlated with obvious coercion, it is worth noting
that together they comprised the principal focus of pre-Miranda voluntariness analysis
in its early days.
13
Miranda has probably not even had much impact on physical abuse in the
interrogation room. Amnesty International has described scores of cases-some of
them during the 1970s (when Miranda should have been in its heyday) and some
more recent-in which confessions were obtained through beatings, torture, and use
of four-point restraints.14 Threats of beatings and the like are presumably even more
common. This kind of brutality has probably been reduced in the past 35 years. But if
so, Miranda had little to do with that reduction; rather it is part of a long-term trend
resulting from public distaste for the third degree, the movement toward police
professionalization, the proliferation of excessive force damages actions, and pre-
Miranda decisions outlawing physical force during interrogation.15
10 See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REv. 761, 823 (1989).
11 See MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE 400 (John W. Strong ed., 3d ed. 1984) (based on a reading of
cases in the 1970s and early 1980s, speaking of "the general increasing distaste for a rigid requirement
that a promise render a confession inadmissible").
12 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that weakly corroborated statements
from a person suffering from delusions were admissible because not "compelled" by the police).
Connelly also held that the confession was admissible under the due process clause, but that holding
seems inconsistent with prior due process holdings, and therefore influenced by Miranda's emphasis on
compulsion. See George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme
Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REv. 231, 305 (1988) (Connelly failed "to acknowledge either the reliability-
assuring function of the due process guarantee or the line of cases construing due process as prohibiting
the use of unreliable evidence in criminal prosecutions.").
13 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884) ("But the presumption upon which weight is given to [a
confession], namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an
untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of
inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because
of a threat or promise .. "); Yale Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on
Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 743 (1963) (arguing
that false confessions were the courts' main concern when applying the voluntariness test); see also supra
note 11.
14 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, USA: A BRIEFING FOR THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE 14-15
(May 2000) (describing cases in Chicago, Alabama, and Tennessee, involving torture, beatings, use of an
electric cattle prod, death threats, and four-point restraints); see also Susan Bandes, Patterns oflnjustice:
Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 1275, 1278 (1999) ("[I]n many significant respects, what
happened [in the Chicago cases described by Amnesty] represents business as usual in Chicago and
throughout the United States.").
15 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
326 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991) ("Evidence is hard to come by but what evidence there is suggests that
any reductions that have been achieved in police brutality are independent of the Court and started before
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If, as the Miranda majority assumed, American interrogation practices in the
1960s needed to be revamped, then they still need to be revamped today, despite over
four decades of Miranda.
III. VALIDATING VOLUNTARINESS
One way to revitalize regulation of interrogation is to get the courts re-interested
in the "voluntariness" inquiry. Admittedly, figuring out what voluntariness means
presents a larger than average problem. Welsh White well summarized the situation
when he noted that "the statement that a defendant's will was overborne is essentially
a legal conclusion, rather than simply an empirical judgment.' ' 6
For those hoping for more regulation of interrogation, however, this type of
indeterminacy does not have to spell defeat. Indeed, it can be turned to advantage.
The fact that we cannot know definitively when a confession is "involuntary" should
become the rationale for seekingper se rules (White's "legal conclusions") telling us
when the interaction of police behavior and suspect characteristics leads to
involuntary statements. Without such rules, courts are wallowing in quicksand with
no means of escape. That, after all, was the motivating insight behind Miranda itself
(and behind the subsequent case of Edwards v. Arizona'7). The Supreme Court's
mistake was in assuming that two rules would do the trick.
I make no attempt to flesh out a law of voluntariness here, except to make note of
three sometimes neglected sources of information that could prove useful in that
endeavor. First, moral theory can provide a framework for thinking about
voluntariness in the interrogation context. As Professor Mitchell Berman recently
wrote, "scholarly efforts over the past few decades have substantially advanced our
understanding" of coercion. 18  Empirical work can also provide eye-opening
information for courts grappling with the voluntariness issue. Research conducted
Miranda."); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations
of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429, 433 n.10 (1998) (stating that as early as the 1930s, "[g]rowing public revulsion
toward third-degree practices, the movement toward police professionalization, and Supreme Court
decisions outlawing physical force during interrogation eventually led to a shift to psychological
tactics").
16 Welsh S. White, Confessions Induced by Broken Government Promises, 43 DUKE L.J. 947,950
(1994). The best example of this phenomenon is the fact that courts are more willing to find involuntary
those confessions that are induced by promises considered to be "false." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 9, at 228-29. False promises are no more likely to overbear one's will than true promises
since, by definition, the suspect doesn't know which is which. But the courts' "legal conclusion" is that
the difference is crucial in deciding voluntariness.
1" 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981) (holding that a request for counsel requires the termination of
questioning).
1 18 Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45 (2002)
(citing, among others, ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987), JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 189-268
(1986), and Peter Westen, "'Freedom "and "Coercion "-Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J.
541).
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over the past thirty years provides insights into the police techniques most likely to
cause false confessions, 19 the most common misunderstandings about the warnings
and the interrogation process, and the types of people most likely to misunderstand
them.20 A final source of ideas worth considering comes from foreign countries. For
instance, England, in its Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, has developed a
detailed set of rules for interrogation, including standards regarding breaks, food and
other amenities. 21 German law explicitly prohibits affirmative misrepresentations by
the police, while permitting police to leave misimpressions uncorrected unless the
misimpressions are about the law.22
Again, my aim here is not to detail what the law of voluntariness might look like,
but to point out that nuanced development of that law is possible.23 The next challenge
is to motivate courts to move in that direction. One possible way of doing so is to
eliminate Miranda.a4 If, as suggested above, proof that warnings were given often
ends the judicial inquiry into the conduct of an interrogation, then courts might well
adopt a stricter view of voluntariness once warnings are de-emphasized. But the
Court's recent decision in United States v. Dickerson25 is pretty good evidence that
Miranda will never be reversed. Furthermore, pre-Miranda case law suggests that
giving up on a warnings requirement could backfire.26 Most importantly, Miranda
cannot be blamed for all of the courts' resistance to a rigorous voluntariness inquiry.
There are deeper reasons-including concern about the difficulty of judicially
devising a real law of voluntariness and acquiescence stemming from a crime control
outlook-that might lead courts to prefer an essentially hands-off approach to the
issue.
19 Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001 (1998).
20 THOMAS T. GRISSO, JUVENILE WAIVER OF RIGHTS (1981); Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without
Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495 (2002).
21 CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE DETENTION, TREATMENT AND QUESTIONING OF PERSONS BY POLICE
OFFICERS §§ 8.6, 12.2 (1999).
22 Thomas Weigend, Germany Rules of Criminal Procedure, in CRAIG BRADLEY, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 202-03 (1999). Germany also prohibits questioning of inmates by
undercover agents. Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice: A Guide to
American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 333,
336-37 (1995).
23 Professor White has made an excellent beginning to this enterprise. See WELSH S. WHITE,
MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS 190-95, 201-14 (2001) (describing a number of "pernicious"
interrogation practives that are likely to move innocent suspects to incriminate themselves); see also
White, supra note 19.
24 See Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, orls It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 461, 504 (1998) ("[S]ince Miranda serves primarily as a useful adjunct to law enforcement, the
police ought not be able to hide behind its false beneficence.").
25 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
26 See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433,438-40 (1958) (interrogator's refusal to honor suspect's
request to confer with counsel does not make confession involuntary); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504,
508 (1958) (reiterating the Court's holding in Crooker). Butsee Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963) (refusing to honor repeated requests to call wife made confession involuntary).
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If an additional push-beyond the nudge that might come from aggressive
advocacy using philosophy, empiricism, and comparative law-is necessary to get
courts to look more closely at the voluntariness notion, it is most likely to come from
exposure to the facts. In the Fourth Amendment context, I have argued for a damages
remedy in place of exclusion, in part because the exclusionary rule has the unfortunate
effect on the judicial mind of equating the Fourth Amendment with guilty people.27
The analogous problem in the confessions context is that voluntariness arguments
almost always appear to be made by criminals trying to evade the consequences of
their own statements. The only way to get trial courts, and through their findings the
appellate courts, to think twice about blithely admitting confessions obtained through
promises, cajolery and deception is to make them graphically aware of how those
techniques can dehumanize everyone involved in the interrogation, whether they are
guilty, innocent, or the police themselves.
IV. THE BASIC ARGUMENT FOR TAPING
Justice Harlan was right when he stated that Miranda provides little aid in
figuring out how police and suspects interact during interrogation.28 Taping is one
obvious solution to that problem. Taping has other advantages as well. It can provide
proof against false accusations aimed at the police, professionalize the interrogation
process, and preserve the details of statements that might come in handy later, all of
which has been shown to increase guilty pleas.29
Yet most police departments still do not tape interrogations.3 ° Those that do use
it sporadically and at their discretion, and very often tape only the end result of the
interview process-the admission.31  Even the FBI, normally the epitome of
professionalism, has refused to adopt a taping requirement.32
27 Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv.
363,402-05.
28 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Those who use third-degree tactics and deny
them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers.").
29 William A. Geller, Videotaping and Confessions, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE AND
POLICING 303, 307-09 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998). Taping can also help
empiricists determine the factors that contribute to confessions, false and otherwise.
30 Id. at 303 ("It is estimated that in 1990, about one-sixth of all police and sheriffs' departments in
the United States.. . videotaped at least some interrogations or confessions.").
31 Id. at 306; see also Wayne T. Westling, Something is Rotten in the Interrogation Room: Let's Try
Video Oversight, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 537, 553 (2001) ("Some departments, including Chicago, have
taken the shortcut of recording only the end result of the interrogation."); David Dixon & Gail Travis,
The Audio- Visual Recording of Police Interrogation in New South Wales, in CRIMINAL LAW 43-44
(Darryl Brown et al. eds., 2001) (on file with author) (recounting that 73.6% of suspects were subject to
some pre-taping interviewing and that many taped interviews "begin with the lengthy adoption of
questions and answers recorded in traditional style in an officer's notebook").
32 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS §§ 7-14
(discouraging recording of interviews) (cited in Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes, Comes a Time: The
Case for Recording Interrogations, 61 MONT. L. REv. 223, 229 n.35 (2000).
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Given the benefits of recording, it is hard to shake the feeling that this reticence
about taping stems from the desire to hide something from the courts. As Richard Leo
notes, the usual explicit government objections to a taping requirement are easily
parried. The cost of videotaping is more than made up for by the savings from
dispensing with "corroboration officers" and the reduction in suppression hearing
challenges from defendants who know the tape will expose their lies about what
happened at the stationhouse.33 In a day when municipalities are spending thousands
of dollars on scores of closed circuit TVs for the purpose of monitoring the public
streets,34 paying for a camera in the interrogation room is unlikely to break the budget.
Nor are suspects intimidated into silence by the cameras. They usually forget they
are even there. 35 Finally, good faith failures to tape (due to equipment failure or other
unforeseen circumstances) should not be grounds for sanction.
A more potent objection to taping is that it will function just like Miranda has: as
a cover for improper police work. Tapes can be doctored. Much more likely (because
not as obviously illegal) is the pre-interrogation interrogation. Conducted at the place
of arrest, in the patrol car, or even in the interrogation room before the tape is turned
on, this interview is designed to get the "cat out of the bag" before the official
interrogation takes place. Either of these maneuvers might allow police to obtain an
involuntary confession without fear it will be memorialized on tape.
These circumventions can be finessed, however. Tape manipulation can be
deterred by strict chain of custody rules, or by giving the suspect a tape of the
interview after it is completed (the latter a practice in New South Wales, Australia 36).
Off-the-record shenanigans can be diminished by requiring that all questioning be
taped,37 or at least by stipulating that all questioning in the stationhouse take place on
tape (as is mandated by English law38) and that only statements that are made on tape
are admissible (which is the rule in some Australian jurisdictions39). If the suspect is
33 Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 687
(1996).
34 See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance ofPublic Places and the Right
to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213, 220-21 (2002) (describing proliferation of closed circuit TV use by
police).
35 See Michael McConville & Philip Morrell, Recording the Interrogation: Have the Police Got It
Taped?, 1983 CRIM. L. REv. 158, 159-60.
36 See Dixon & Travis, supra note 31 (describing New South Wales procedure that produces one
videotape and three audio tapes of each interrogation, with one of the latter being given to the suspect);
see also § 570D Criminal Code (Western Australia) (requiring police to give defendant a copy of the
videotape).
37 Even courts that are friendly toward a taping requirement have been hostile to this extra
requirement. In 2002, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that its holding in State v. Scales, 581 N.W.2d
587 (Minn. 1994), to the effect that untaped statements made during custodial interrogation are not
admissible, would not be extended to noncustodial interrogations. See State v. Conger, 652 N.W.2d 704,
708-09 (Minn. 2002). It also pointed out that this stance was consistent with the law of Alaska and
Texas, the only other states with a taping requirement. Id.
38 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, § 60 (Eng.).
39 Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, § 263(3) (Queensland); § 74E Summary Offences Act
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told of the latter rule at the outset of the taping, the cat-out-the-bag phenomenon
would be further ameliorated.4°
Again, here in the United States police are not likely to develop such rules
themselves and, with two exceptions, legislatures have been moribund in this area.41
What is needed is a constitutional rationale for rules like this, one that would at least
be persuasive in state, if not in federal, court. Such a rationale could come from at
least three different constitutional provisions-the Due Process Clause, the Fifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment Right of
Confrontation.
All three arguments are strong, if we adopt two assumptions. First, an exact
accounting of interrogation events-from the way the warnings are given to the
precise nature of any threats, promises, and deceptions that occur-is needed to
determine whether statements are voluntary in the totality of the circumstances.
Second, this kind of record is very difficult to generate solely from testimony by the
police and the suspect, even if we assume that they try to be honest. As the Alaska
Supreme Court stated in Stephan v. State, the first decision to require taping:
It is not because a police officer is more dishonest than the rest of
us that we . . . demand an objective recordation of the critical
events. Rather, it is because we are entitled to assume that he is no
less human-no less inclined to reconstruct and interpret past
events in a light most favorable to himself-that we should not
permit him to be a "judge of his own cause. 42
The most direct support for the conclusion that voluntariness can only be
assessed through a recorded account of the interrogation is the fact that we insist on
transcripts in the analogous civil context. Prolonged face-to-face questioning of one
party by the opposing party that is conducted with the goal of producing evidence for
trial virtually always takes place at a deposition, and a deposition that is not recorded
in some fashion is always inadmissible in evidence.43 With this truism about
(South Australia); § 464H Crimes Act (Victoria); § 570D Criminal Code (Western Australia); § 143
Police Administration Act (Northern Territory); § 108 Criminal Procedure Act (New South Wales).
40 Of course, the Court has rejected an analogous requirement outside the taping context. Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316-17 (1985). But Elstad also recognized that if the earlier confession is the
result of "real" coercion, then the second confession would also be inadmissible. Id. at 312-13. The
point of the taping requirement is to give courts the information they need to determine whether coercion
occurred at any point in the interrogation process.
41 TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PRO., art 38.22, § 3 (1999) (oral statements during a custodial interrogation
admissible only if electronically recorded); ILL. COMP. ST. 725 §§ 5/103-2.1 (West 2003) (statements of
homicide suspects during custodial interrogation at places "of detention" inadmissible unless taped).
42 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) (quoting Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A Hard
Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEo. L.J. 209, 242-43 (1977)). Of course, the same could be said for
suspects as well.
43 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (requiring recording of deposition). Pretrial interviews of non-party
witnesses are often more informal, but even here depositions are typical when the desire is to have
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interrogation in civil cases in mind, it is stunning that we do not require verbatim
transcripts of criminal interrogations, where the stakes are so much higher, access to
information about psychological pressures so much more important, and legal
representation (of either party) so much less likely.
These preliminary observations set the stage for a brief elaboration of the three
constitutional reasons taping of interrogations should be required.
V. THE DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT
The due process argument for taping is that it is the only way the government can
meet its obligation to preserve evidence that is exculpatory. As evidenced by the large
number of courts that have rejected it,44 this argument is not immediately persuasive.
In California v. Trombetta45 and Arizona v. Youngblood 6 the Supreme Court held that
intentional failure to preserve forensic evidence or its intentional destruction violates
due process only when the exculpatory value of the evidence is "apparent" (rendering
the government in bad faith) and the defendant has no other way of reproducing
comparable information. Most courts that have applied this rule to recording of
interrogations point out that police seldom know when questioning will produce
exculpatory evidence, even when that term is defined to include evidence of
involuntariness as well as of innocence, 47 and that in any event the suspect can always
tell the court his story about the interrogation. For instance, one court stated that a
recording of the suspect's statements would only have been "potentially useful," 
48
testimony "available for use or confrontation at the trial, or to have the witness committed to a specific
representation for such facts as he might present." Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41
n.4 (2d Cir. 1975). Edelstein is considered a leading case on the permissibility of informal interviews for
discovery purposes. See RICHARD L. MARCUS ETAL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 392-93
(3d ed. 2000).
44 See Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 32, at 232 n.52.
4' 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
46 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
47 One might object as a preliminary matter that the Due Process Clause cannot apply in this
situation because an involuntary confession does not necessarily tend to prove factual innocence. One
response is that at least some involuntary confessions are clearly false and can lead to inaccurate verdicts
on guilt. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 15, at 433 (reporting "a study of sixty cases of police-induced false
confessions in the post-Miranda era"). More importantly, as even the courts that have been hostile to a
taping requirement seem to recognize, the government's duty to provide exculpatory evidence has been
defined more broadly than a simple focus on factual innocence. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (requiring disclosure of evidence when "there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different")
(emphasis added). As long as exclusion remains the remedy for involuntary confessions, the Bagley test
will be met whenever the government withholds information tending to show involuntariness. Imagine,
for instance, that the suspect confesses to a crime he committed, but only after (unknowingly) being
drugged. Most courts would presumably consider the fact of drugging "exculpatory" in the Bagley sense,
even though the confession is accurate.
48 Holloway v. Horn, 161 F. Supp. 2d 453, 530 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at
486).
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rather than obviously relevant to an involuntariness challenge, and another pointed out
that "[]ack of an electronic recording did not preclude the defendant from challenging
the accuracy of the officers' recollection of the interrogation. '49
The first point misconceives the nature of the police malfeasance in failing to
tape. While many interrogations undoubtedly are conducted properly, we cannot be
sure that conclusion is warranted with respect to a particular interrogation until a court
says so. And given the assumptions made above-which together hold that verbatim
records are necessary for voluntariness assessments-a court cannot say so until it has
viewed the tape. Accordingly, failing to tape a confession is worse than destroying
forensic evidence that has been tested (the situation involved in Trombetta°). At least
in the latter situation an objective analysis of the blood, semen or hair has taken place
before the evidence is destroyed; when an interrogation is not taped, in contrast,
objective analysis of voluntariness can never occur. In short, failure to tape an
interrogation is failure to preserve evidence which is crucial to determining the
outcome of trial, and when intentional (as it will be if taping was possible) should be
considered bad faith.
Protesting that defendants can make their exculpatory case without a tape is also
unpersuasive, if one adopts the assumptions made above. Absent a tape, courts are
forced to rely on the incomplete and biased accounts of the parties, which is an
insufficient basis for assessing voluntariness. It was this reasoning, more or less, that
proved persuasive to the Alaska Supreme Court in Stephan, which based its decision
primarily on due process considerations (albeit derived from the Alaskan constitution
rather than the federal one).51 To the same effect are the many lower court cases that
find inadequate as a constitutional matter verbal descriptions of lineups for purposes
of reconstructing the identification process. 52 If lineups must be recorded for the
defense, certainly interrogations, which involve psychological as well as physical
events, should be.
49 State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 771 (Tenn. 2001).
5 467 U.S. at 481 ("[T]he question presented is whether the Due Process Clause requires law
enforcement agencies to preserve breath samples of suspected drunken drivers in order for the results of
breath-analysis tests to be admissible in criminal prosecutions."). Failing to tape an interrogation is also
worse than allowing evidence to deteriorate before it is ever tested (the situation in Youngblood, 488 U.S.
at 54), because in the latter situation the government presumably does not present either test results or the
underlying forensic evidence. In the untaped interrogation context, on the other hand, the government is
relying on the results of an interrogation it has failed to preserve adequately.
51 Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985); cf State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn.
1994) (adopting a taping requirement "in the exercise of our supervisory power to insure the fair
administration of justice").
52 See, e.g., United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (videotape solely of lineup
insufficient); People v. Curtis, 497 N.E.2d 1004 (111. 1986) (photograph required); Bruce v. State, 375
N.E.2d. 1042 (Ind. 1978) (requiring videotape of lineup); People v. Fowler, 461 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1969)
(finding still photographs inadequate). These cases are based on the Sixth Amendment, discussed infra.
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VI. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENT
If the Miranda regime is a prophylactic manner of implementing the right to
remain silent, then a taping requirement appears to be even more so, for it would
require police to tape not only "voluntary" unwarned statements, but even voluntary
warned statements. Dickerson tells us, however, that rules that exclude noncompelled
statements can still be constitutional rules. 3 More importantly, a taping requirement
in contested cases is not as prophylactic as it seems, if viewed as a matter of proof
rather than, as Miranda is viewed, as a means of deterring compulsion. The Supreme
Court has held that the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
police gave warnings, that the suspect understood the warnings, and that any waiver of
the rights incorporated in those warnings is voluntary and intelligent.5 4 If one assumes
that voluntariness cannot be assessed without taping, the tapeless prosecutor cannot
meet that burden, at least where the defendant plausibly asserts he did not receive or
understand warnings, was misled about them, or received improper threats, promises
and the like. In such cases, at best the parties are in equipoise, and the party with the
burden of proof-the government-should lose.
Ultimately, however, the Fifth Amendment claim is not based on logic, but on
history. The drafters of the Fifth Amendment obviously did not contemplate that
suspect questioning be taped. But their conception of interrogation and the method
for proving what it produced involved something quite similar. Because organized
police forces did not exist at the time,55 interrogations in colonial times were always
conducted byjudges, during preliminary examinations in open court. 6 Assuming we
are not going to move back toward that model, 57 the closest modem equivalent is a
recording, presented to the judge. A historical perspective on the Fifth Amendment
dictates that if the court is not going to conduct the questioning, it should at least
53 See Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theoryfor Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and
the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 3 (2001) (after Dickerson, "the
same statement might be deemed compelled [under Miranda] and not compelled [under the Due Process
Clause] in the same case.").
54 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167-70 (1986) (explaining that the burden is on state to
disprove both Miranda and due process violations by preponderance of the evidence).
55 Roger Lane, Urban Police and Crime in Nineteenth Century America, in MODERN POLICING, 1, 5
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992) (In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
"[e]nforcement of criminal law.., was largely the responsibility either of the community as a whole or
of the individual victim of some offense, rather than something delegated to specialized agents of the
state.").
56 John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common
Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047, 1059-60 (1994); Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the
Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1086, 1099-104
(1994).
57 For a suggestion in that regard, see Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A
Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1224 (1932); see also Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B.
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857, 899
(1995).
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receive a verbatim account of how the questioning went. 5
VII. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENT
The confrontation argument derives from a right to counsel case, United States v.
Wade.59 In Wade the Supreme Court held that, under the Sixth Amendment, suspects
placed in lineups after indictment are entitled to counsel. The Court's language,
however, focused on confrontation concerns, not the need for a lineup lawyer per se.
First, the Court suggested that the right it recognized could be met not only by the
presence of an attorney, but also by provision of "substitute counsel, 6 ° which
presumably could include a recording of the lineup, as lower courts have recognized.6
Second, the reason counsel or "substitute counsel" must be present at the lineup is that
the accused would otherwise be "deprived of that right of cross-examination which is
an essential safeguard to his right to confront the witnesses against him., 62 The
"vagaries" of eyewitness identification during a lineup can only be effectively
challenged, said the Court, if adequate observation of the identification process
occurs.
6 3 In essence, the Wade Court adopted in the lineup context the same two
assumptions I have adopted for the interrogation context. Interrogation is subject to
even more vagaries than the lineup process, and counsel or a substitute-i.e., taping-
is necessary to make sure we know about those vagaries.
Wade's right to counsel was subsequently limited to post-charging lineups,64 and
a right to taping, so limited, would be close to useless, since most interrogations take
place before charging. But, again, the Sixth Amendment argument made here is not
based on the right to counsel, but on the right of confrontation. And the Court has
never limited the right of confrontation to events that occur post-charging. For
instance, the Court has routinely applied the Confrontation Clause to exclude hearsay
statements made well before any formal charging of the suspect takes place. 65 The
58 If history is to be the guide, we might also allow adverse inferences from silence, as was the case
in colonial times. Amar & Lettow, supra note 57, at 899. But Miranda prohibited that inference, or at
least banned the decision maker from drawing that inference post-warnings. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.
610(1976).
'9 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
60 Id. at 237.
61 Although the Court in Wade was clearly referring to a human substitute, lower courts have been
quite willing to include videotape as a substitute. See cases cited supra note 52.
62 388 U.S. at 235.
63 id. at 228.
64 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). One might also argue that Wade's critical stage approach
was overruled by United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), which rejected a right to counsel at photo
arrays. But the principal reason for the holding in Ash was that a photo array does not require the
defendant to confront the "intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor." Id. at 309.
This distinguishes it from interrogation, as Ash itself recognized. Id. at 312.
65 For a recent example, see Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), where the Court held that a co-
defendant's confession made before the defendant was charged was inadmissible against the defendant
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rationale in those cases, like the rationale being advanced here for exclusion of
untaped confessions, is that the state's evidence cannot be effectively challenged by
the defense.
VIII. A NON-WAVABLE "RIGHT"
Those are, in a nutshell, the three arguments for requiring the taping of
interrogations. One last point needs to be made. Whether based on due process, the
Fifth Amendment, or the right of confrontation, the taping requirement should not be
waivable. If suspects could relinquish the right to be taped we can be assured that,
just as 80% of those told of their Miranda rights waive them, 66 a large percentage of
those informed that they have a right to a recording will give up that prerogative.
Some will do so because police convince them taping is a bad idea, others because
they mistakenly believe untaped confessions are inadmissible even when they forfeit
the right, and others because they are coerced into waiver in subtle or not so subtle
ways.
The insistence that taping occur regardless of the defendant's desires rests on
more than concern for the constitutional rights of defendants, however. Government
and society at large also have a strong interest in verbatim recording of interrogation,
an interest that defendants should not be able to waive even if they can give rational
reasons for doing so. A defendant may not be tried while incompetent, regardless of
his or her desires, because society wants to ensure the integrity of the trial process and
a meaningful confrontation between the accused and the accusers.67 Similarly, the
taping requirement should be sacrosanct because government should want to know
precisely what happens in the interrogation room as a means of protecting the
accuracy and fairness of the criminal process.68
IX. CONCLUSION
If the goal is effective regulation of the interrogation process, Miranda is not
doing the job. A rejuvenated voluntariness analysis is much more likely to
accomplish the task. That rejuvenation will take place only if taping of interrogations
under the Confrontation Clause.
66 See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of
the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REv. 839, 859 (1996) (83.7% waiver rate); Richard A. Leo, Inside
the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 (1996) (78% waiver rate).
67 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (requiring trial court to inquire into competency any time
there is a "bona fide" doubt on the issue).
68 Two other issues that I leave unresolved are the appropriate remedy for a failure to tape and
whether audiotape, as opposed to videotape, is sufficient. Although exclusion is the typical remedy, see
Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Alaska 1985), I am agnostic about the remedy issue, if a viable
damages remedy can be developed. See Slobogin, supra note 27, at 368-92. The Wade precedent is a
strong argument for videotape, since audiotape is unlikely to be a sufficient "substitute" for counsel, but
audiotape may be all that is reasonably available in some jurisdictions.
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routinely occurs. And taping is likely to occur only if courts require it. This essay
gives them three constitutional bases for doing so.
It should be recognized, however, that the regulatory regime proposed here
could, like Miranda, easily be compromised. Failure to protect against pre-taping
interviews or willingness to permit suspects to waive the "right" to a recording would
significantly undermine a taping requirement. And of course, given its amorphous
nature, there are all sorts of ways the voluntariness rule can be emasculated. If the
courts are courageous enough to adopt this route they will have to be continually
courageous to achieve any lasting impact.
